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 2 
aBsTRacT1 
Islamic finance starts from one basic concept that is to 
avoid trading directly present for future money.  
Finance is provided in the form of money in return for 
either equity or rights to share proportionately in 
future business profits.  It is also provided in the form 
of goods and services delivered in return for 
commitment to repay their value at a future date.  This 
is an obvious option in addition to the conventional 
practices of interest-based finance.  This paper 
addresses itself to four questions: (1) Why all the fuss 
about the rate of interest?  (2) Is Islamic finance, as an 
alternative to interest based debt finance viable and 
efficient?  (3) What Islamic finance implies for the 
whole economy?  (4) Given that Islamic finance is 
really viable, why it has not been adopted at a larger 
scale? 
  
                                                   
1 The author wishes to express his appreciation for many scholars who made extensive comments on earlier 
drafts, including Muhamad Umer Chapra, Mohamed Finaish, Nejatullah Siddiqui, Anas Zarqa, Mohamad 
Elqari, Sami Sweilem, M. Fahim Khan, Munawar Iqbal, and Tariqullah Khan.  He is also indebted to two 
anonimous referees for their substantive comments.  Opinions experessed do not necessaritly reflect those 
of IRTI or the IDB. 
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IslamIc FINaNcE: a cONcIsE DEscRIPTION 
Islamic finance starts from one basic concept that is to 
avoid trading directly present for future money.  
Finance is provided in the form of money in return for 
either equity or rights to share proportionately in 
future business profits.  It is also provided in the form 
of goods and services delivered in return for 
commitment to repay their value at a future date2.  
This is an obvious option in addition to the 
conventional practices of interest-based finance 
through which people borrow money and pay it back 
in the future in addition to interest.  The reader may 
ask: 
WHY ALL THE FUSS ABOUT THE RATE OF 
INTEREST?  
1. Is Islamic finance, as an alternative to interest based 
finance, viable and efficient? 
2. What does Islamic finance imply for the whole 
economy? 
3. Given that Islamic finance is really viable, why is the 
world not looking forward to adopt it at a much 
larger scale? 
As we describe the main features of Islamic finance, 
the reader will find answers to the above questions.  
THE RATE OF INTEREST: 
During the last three hundred years the Western 
World has evolved the current system of finance whose 
                                                   
2 The reverse, that is to provide cash against the future delivery of goods would also be permissible under 
certain conditions. 
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cornerstone is the rate of interest.  Huge amounts of 
debt are being traded in national and international 
financial markets every working hour, exceeding the 
gross domestic products of many countries.  Since 
then, lending at a rate of interest has become a 
household practice allover the world.  As to developing 
countries, they have played little role in establishing 
the current financial system.  They have either 
adopted the current practice or inherited it from their 
former colonial masters.   
Until the middle of the twentieth century, it seemed to 
everyone that no wrong could be found with the 
system.  That is when economics has matured as a 
scientific discipline that commanded both intellectual 
as well as political influence.  Economists, staying 
within the boundaries of “positive analysis” that 
purports avoidance of moral judgment, considered the 
rate of interest as a price: it is the relative price of 
present money to future money.  You could rarely find 
an economist who would call for a zero price for 
anything, as prices serve as important tools in 
resource allocation. 
However, in search for optimal monetary policies 
economists stumbled on the relationship between the 
level of the rate of interest and the optimality of 
resource allocation.  Monetary economists found that a 
zero nominal interest rate is a necessary condition for 
the optimal allocation of resources (Friedman, 1969).  
The reason is simple.  After switching from metallic to 
fiat money, adding one marginal unit of real balances 
costs no real resources to the community.  Therefore, 
imposing a positive price on the use of money would 
lead traders to economize on the use of money, in their 
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pursuit to minimize their transactions costs.  They 
would therefore use some real resources instead of 
money.  However, when the rate of interest is zero, 
traders will have no incentive to substitute real 
resources for money.  More real resources can 
therefore be directed to consumption and investment.  
When this matter was investigated within general 
equilibrium models, it was found that a zero interest 
rate is both necessary and sufficient for allocative 
efficiency (Cole and Kocherlakota, 1998; Wilson, 1979).  
Though these theoretical results are dependent on 
some simplifying assumptions, they are robust in a 
variety of models (Correia and Teles, 1997).  They 
imply that the long forgotten Christian and Jewish 
teachings as well as those of Islam and Hinduism that 
prohibit the charge of interest on loans are not an 
aberration.  It is amazing to see such religious 
teaching stay valid after so many centuries. 
In Milton Friedman’s words, “Our final rule for the 
optimum quantity of money is that it will be 
attained by a rate of price deflation that makes 
the rate of interest equal to zero.”3  Friedman goes 
further to suggest steadily contracting the money 
supply at a rate equal to the representative household 
time preference (Friedman, 1969, p. 34 quoted by 
Ireland, 2000). 
Accordingly, economists are expected to search for the 
set of monetary policies that would bring the rate of 
interest to zero, in order to reach an optimal allocation 
of resources.  They depend on the relationship known 
as the Fisher hypothesis, which decomposes (in the 
                                                   
3 We have brought this quotation in order to show that what is intended is not to impose a zero rate of 
interest on the national economy, by to reach the desired level through the process of deflation.  
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terms used by St-Amant, 1996) the nominal interest 
rates as the sum of expected inflation and ex ante real 
interest rates: 
ttt Eri )(π+= ,                                                                            
)1(        
where iRtR is the nominal interest rate at time t, tr  is the 
ex ante real interest rate, or as defined by Cole and 
Kocherlakota (1998), the rate of return on real 
(physical) capital net of depreciation or the rental rate 
on capital goods, and tE )(π  is the expected inflation rate 
at time t for a specified future period.  
Setting ti  equal to zero implies that the real rate of 
interest r is equal to the rate of deflation.  Therefore, it 
appears that deflating the economy at a rate equal to 
the real rate of interest would automatically set the 
(nominal) rate of interest to zero.  This would be the 
optimal monetary policy rule that insures that 
financial resources are allocated efficiently. 
Such policy rule clearly implies that the optimal rate of 
inflation is negative.  However, Central bankers would 
never seriously advocate a long-run policy of deflation 
(Wolman, 1997). 
Deflating the economy would bring with it several 
problems both conceptually and practically.  
Conceptually, economists would naturally worry about 
the existence of a liquidity trap when the rate of 
interest is zero (Uhlig, Harald, 2000).  Several 
economists point out that deflationary policies have to 
be exercised only asymptotically in order to apply the 
Friedman’s Rule (Cole and Kocherlakota, 1998).  Even 
if the asymptotic conditions are not fulfilled, short-
term constraints on monetary policy can do the job 
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(Ireland, 2000).  Others may worry that when the rate 
of interest becomes very low, monetary authorities 
have less leeway with adjusting it downwards in the 
face of recession.  Meanwhile, some economists 
respond by proposing alternative ways to overcome the 
zero-bound on interest rate policy (Goodfriend, 2000).  
Another conceptual problem is that deflation has 
efficiency problems parallel to those of inflation, even 
at very low interest rates (Lucas, 1994).  However, the 
welfare cost of implementing a zero rate of interest has 
been found negligible (Wolman, 1997).   
Consensus among economists appears to be that 
practical and conceptual problems involved with zero 
interest rates are all surmountable.  Nonetheless, 
monetary authorities are not yet impressed.  No 
monetary authority has so far come forward to adopt 
the optimal monetary policy rule4.  
THE ISLAMIC OPTION 
It is obvious that interest-free loans cannot be used on 
a large scale to finance investment.  Such loans would 
appear to be philanthropic rather than enterprising 
actions5.  In other words, the Friedman’s Rule is to 
satiate money holders with cash for transactions 
purposes.  However, when it comes to financing 
investment, another institutional arrangement must 
be found to provide finance independently from 
philanthropic incentives and at the same time do not 
involve payment of interest on loans.  Towards this 
end, Islamic finance provides finance modes that avoid 
                                                   
4 Economists also recommended the application of 100 percent required reserve ratio.  However, policy-
makers have not been impressed, despite the obvious benefits. 
5 Muslims are encouraged by their religion to give ‘Qard Hassan” or interest-free loans to the poor as an act 
of charity. 
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lending at interest6.  Hence, there would be no rate of 
interest to try to reduce to zero.  In his way, the 
problem of efficient allocation of resources is 
automatically resolved.   
The option of Islamic finance encompasses an 
institutional set up that could be applied at the level of 
individual enterprises, namely banks or financial 
institutions.  Each bank and/or financial institution 
can apply Islamic modes of finance either to all its 
operations or to a window extended to those interested 
in benefiting from such rules.  Its financial product 
would carry the distinctive quality of being Islamic7.  It 
can also be applied at a system-wide scale, where the 
whole banking and financial system operates 
according to the rules of Islamic finance. 
The system of Islamic finance is strongly enforced by a 
group of moral values that abhor selling future for 
present money to which Muslims devoutly adhere.  
Such values are also shared by the followers of the 
other two revealed religions, Judaism and Christianity.  
This gives addional strength to the system and 
enforces its modes of transactions.   
Some may think that Islamic finance is just “interest-
free” finance enforcing a zero interest rate on the 
economy and running contrary to market rules.  
Nothing can be farther from reality.  The logic of 
keeping a zero rate of interest has been formed for a 
fiat-money market economy, with an integrated debt 
                                                   
6 Needless to say, extending interest-free loans to the needy remains a laudable philanthropic activity in 
Islam. 
7 One cannot help but notice that the word “Islamic” in this context could have two meanings.  The first 
refers to the quality of the financial product, viz., that it satisfies the Islamic requirements for lawful 
contracts.  The second is that it satisfies ethical standards as defined by religion.  In this sense, Islamic 
finance is equally Christian, Jewish and Hindu. 
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market where future money is traded against present 
money.  The Islamic economic system, while based on 
market rules, has no integrated debt market and 
future money cannot be traded against present money.  
That makes the “Islamic modes of finance” the central 
institutional setup that replaces both the rate of 
interest and the integrated debt market.     
To explain the Islamic option, we start with a short 
description of how Islamic banks and financial 
institutions work and then explain the finance modes 
used by them.   
I. ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE 
A. ISLAMIC BANKS 
Islamic banks operate in ways that differ from their 
conventional counterparts.  On the liability side, they 
mobilize financial resources through Mudaraba (profit 
and loss sharing, PLS), through which the fund owner 
allows the bank to invest his/her funds in return for a 
preagreed share in the profits8.   
Funds can also be mobilized through Wakala, or 
agency contract, where the bank acts as the 
customer’s agent in investing the funds, in return for a 
commission that is paid regardless of the results of 
that investment. 
On the asset side, Islamic banks can provide funds to 
customers (households and business enterprises) 
through 12 contracts or modes of finance that are 
elaborated below. 
B. ISLAMIC MODES OF FINANCE 
                                                   
8 This of course does not mean that the rate of return is predetermined. 
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In place of the classical loan contract, an Islamic bank 
can use a total of 12 contracts to mobilize or place 
resources in investment.  They are known as “the 
Islamic modes of finance.”  
Islamic modes of finance can be grouped into three 
categories: (i) partnership in profit and product, (ii) 
commodity finance, and (iii) leasing, (iv) Agency 
Agreement. 
1. Partnership in Profit: 
Similarly, the bank can advance funds on the basis of 
Mudaraba, where only profit and loss is shared but 
management remains with the finance user.  Funds 
can also be advanced through Wakala (agency 
agreement), which can be restricted or unrestricted.   
Partnership in profit and product is a form of equity 
finance.  It encompasses two forms: Musharaka and 
Mudaraba.  Musharaka entails sharing in both 
management, profits and losses.  Musharaka can be 
diminishing, meaning that it can be made for a certain 
number of years, during which the bank’s share in the 
joint venture would be extinguished every year.       
Meanwhile, Mudaraba finance implies that finance 
providers would provide finance for a share in profit 
only but not in management.  This usually takes place 
not for the whole life of the financed enterprise, as in 
case of Musharaka, but for a shorter period, as in the 
case of providing working capital finance. Mudaraba 
can be unrestricted (bearing no preconditions) or 
restricted, e. g., by type or place of investment.  Hence, 
partnership in profit includes the following forms: 
1.1. Unrestricted Mudaraba,  
1.2. Restricted Mudaraba,  
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1.3. Musharaka,  
1.4. Diminishing Musharaka,  
2. Partnership in Product  
Partnership in product is designed to be used in 
financing agricultural activities, and include: 
2.1. Muzara’a, the bank agrees to till the land for 
its owner in consideration for an agreed part of 
the produce.  The bank will therefore finance the 
process of cropping. 
2.2. Musaqa, is an agreement in which the owner 
of a garden shares its produce with another 
person in a pre-determined ratio in return for 
latter's services in irrigating the garden.  Musaqa 
is also applicable to trees used for purposes other 
than fruits like wood and rubber. It can also 
involve crop enterprises besides orchards/trees. 
2.3. Mugharasa, is an agreement in which a 
landlord gives his bare land to the bank to plant 
fruit trees on the condition that they share the 
trees or their fruit in accordance with a defined 
percentage.  In this case, the bank provides all 
finance for planting the trees. 
3. Wakala or Agency:  The bank can advance funds to 
an investor to invest it in return for a commission, 
while all profit is gained and all loss is borne by the 
bank.  The bank can provide the investor, as an 
incentive, with a portion of the profit over and above 
a certain hurdle rate.  
3.1. Unrestricted Wakala: The bank provides an 
investor with funds to invest without restrictions.  
3.2. Restricted Wakala: The bank provides an 
investor with funds to invest with certain 
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restrictions, usually a group of do’s and don’t’s. 
4. Commodity Finance: 
Financing commodity purchases can be done through 
sale contracts that take several forms.  First, the bank 
may purchase such commodities and sell them against 
deferred payment, usually done in installments.  One 
way to conclude such sale is through Murabaha, a 
procedure in which the customer provides a self-
binding promise to purchase commodities at cost plus 
a markup.  Based on this promise, the bank 
purchases and takes possession of such commodities, 
signs, a sale contract that sets the payment schedule 
and delivers the commodities to the customer.   
Alternatively, the bank may have acquired certain 
goods, e.g., consumers’ durables, vehicles, etc, and 
placed them in showrooms.  It offers them directly to 
customers against deferred payment, Bai’ Bethaman 
Ajel.   Second, the bank may advance the value of 
commodities, e. g., agricultural products, to farmers to 
enable them to finance their crops.  Commodities 
would be delivered at a predetermined future dates.  
Such contract is called Salam. 
Another form of sale is Istisna', which means 
command to manufacture.  Such contract is useable 
with goods with known specifications but must be 
manufactured.  The customer signs an Istisna' 
contract with the bank to manufacture, e.g., passenger 
planes.  The bank in turn signs a parallel Istisna' 
contract with the actual manufacturer to produce the 
planes.  The bank pays the manufacturer according to 
verified stages of production, while the customer pays 
for the planes in installments. 
Alternatively, the bank can purchase assets or 
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command their manufacture and sell their usufruct to 
customers, i.e., lease the assets under an operating 
Ijarah (lease contract).  It can also lease such assets 
on the basis of Ijarah Muntahia Bettamleek (lease that 
ends with title transfer, or financial lease).  
Commodity finance implies that the financing 
institution provides goods and services for spot 
delivery in return for a debt instrument that promises 
payment of their value at a specified future date.  That 
value differs from spot prices by a certain margin 
called mark-up.   
The debt instrument is not negotiable.  In case of 
temporary insolvency the debtor is granted an 
extension with no increase in maturity value.  Only 
delinquent debtors with no valid excuses can be 
subjected to penalty.  Alternatively, the financing 
institution can pay the value of the goods and services 
spot and get them delivered at some specified time in 
the future.  In this case, the debt instrument would be 
written in terms of goods and services. 
Some may think that this type of sales finance is no 
different from interest.  They may say that trading 
present against future money involves explicit interest, 
while trading goods against future money may involve 
implicit interest.  While both interest and markup 
reflect time preference, the latter is far from similar to 
the former.  Several differences can be cited in this 
regard9.  First, the nominal value of the debt involved 
in sales finance cannot grow by itself.  The value of 
debt is set at the time of sale and cannot be increased.  
                                                   
9 I am indebted for this explanation to one of the two anonymous referees who have contributed to 
improving this paper. 
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In contrast, interest is set as a compound rate per unit 
of time, allowing the nominal value of debt to grow 
until it has been repaid.  Second, finance is provided 
in conjunction with acquiring and subsequently using 
a commodity.  This has serious implications with 
regard to the relationship between the real and the 
financial sectors, which will be taken up further below.       
Commodity finance also involves Ijarah or leasing. This 
in turn can take the form of an operating lease finance 
in which that the financing institution purchases a 
durable asset and leases it to a customer in return for 
regular payments reflecting the cost of holding, 
maintaining the asset in addition to transferring the 
property of the asset from the financing institution to 
finance recipients.  It can take the form of a financial 
lease, i.e., a lease that ends up with a title transfer to 
the lessee.    
Therefore, the commodity finance modes include: 
4.1. Murabaha,  
4.2. Bai’ Bethaman Ajel,  
4.3. Salam,  
4.4. Istisna',  
4.5. Operating Ijarah, and  
4.6. Financial Ijarah.  
We can therefore expect Islamic banks to hold equity 
in corporations and sit on their boards of directors.  
They use the information obtained from their vantage 
point to reduce risk from information asymmetry and 
to   fine-tune their finance directed to the same 
corporations.  In addition, they can trade in goods and 
services, provide Islamic insurance, and operate in 
financial markets.  In other words, they operate like 
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universal rather than commercial banks. 
C. BANK DEPOSITS IN ISLAMIC BANKING 
In addition to demand deposits, which are guaranteed 
but earn no return, Islamic banks also take 
investment deposits for specific maturities.  
Investment deposits are either general or restricted.  
The former are grouped with bank equity in one pool 
and invested in several ways.  Each earns a 
proportional share of the net profit of the pool.  The 
latter are placed in specific investments chosen by 
respective depositors and earn a proportional share of 
the profit on their investment.   
In all cases, Islamic banks use the deposits they 
obtain to provide finance in the modes outlined above 
and get a proportion of the profit or a commission as a 
fee.   
Islamic banks get a proportion of the profit in 
compensation for their efforts; the profit-sharing ratio 
between each bank and depositors must be therefore 
set at the outset.  However, the actual rate of return 
eventually paid out on Investment deposits is not 
predetermined.  It is closely linked to the performance 
of the real economy, as finance modes are generally 
directed to finance trade in goods and services as well 
as the actual production processes.  It also depends 
upon the performance of individual banks in relation 
to the choice and management of investment. 
D. ISLAMIC NON-BANKING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
There can be a variety of non-banking financial 
institutions that collect funds without taking deposits 
and use Islamic finance modes to provide finance to 
entrepreneurs.  They mobilize funds through selling 
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stocks, mutual shares, and a variety of instruments 
with a wide choice of risk sharing and maturities. 
Non-banking financial institutions have even greater 
flexibility to deal with equity and partnership than 
universal banks, as they are not encumbered with 
guaranteed demand deposits.  The advantages of 
financing working capital requirements to enterprises 
in which they hold equity can therefore be more 
pronounced than in universal banking.    
More light can be shed on how Islamic banking and 
financial institutions operate when we explain the 
Islamic modes of finance. 
II. ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS10 
Financial instruments play an important role in 
reducing transactions costs for both savers and 
investors.  As they can be tailored to the tastes and 
requirements of both parties, they can drastically 
reduce the cost of negotiating terms related to size, 
maturity, profit-sharing formula and other relevant 
conditions.   
Financial instruments increase the reach of financial 
institutions to fund suppliers and users, enabling 
institutions to deal with large numbers of customers 
and thus realize significant economies of scale.  This 
reach factor manifests itself through the ability of 
trading instruments in primary and secondary 
markets.  In this regard, we can find two advantages of 
Islamic financial instruments over their traditional 
counterparts. 
First, in pricing their services, the issuers of Islamic 
                                                   
10  Al-Jarhi, 1998. 
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financial instruments have wider latitude.  When 
dealing with savers and investors, they negotiate a 
profit share between zero and 100.  Conventional 
security issuers, meanwhile, are bound to negotiate a 
small cut within the much narrower differential 
between the borrowing and lending rates.  Wider 
latitude enables financial intermediaries to be more 
effective in mobilizing resources on the one hand and 
attracting investors on the other.   
In a conventional economy, when intermediaries raise 
the rate of interest to mobilize more savings, they have 
to charge investors correspondingly higher rates of 
interest.  In Islamic finance, intermediaries can 
mobilize more savings by offering higher rates of profit 
sharing to savers; the profit here would be obtained 
from investment net of all costs including finance 
costs.  Meanwhile, they can entice more investment by 
offering investors higher profit share, that would 
implicitly mean lower finance costs.  In other words, 
attracting more saving does not conflict with enticing 
more investment in Islamic finance.  Islamic finance 
can therefore be said to have consistency of purpose 
that is missing in conventional finance.  
It is rather interesting to conclude that financial 
intermediation in the non-banking sector would imply 
lower transactions costs and mobilize both savings 
and investment more effectively than conventional 
finance. 
Financial instruments can take the following forms: 
1. Shares in companies: 
Shares in companies represent undivided common 
shares in the company net assets.  In order for the 
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company to be “Shari'a compliant,” it has to be 
established for an acceptable purpose.  It should not 
trade in or produce unlawful goods (goods prohibited 
by Shari'a), like tobacco, alcohol, narcotics, pork and 
pork products, illegal weapons, and products that 
harm human, animal or plant life or the environment.  
The company must not deal with conventional debt.  
Since such companies are rarely found, Shari'a 
scholars have set some guidelines or standards to 
screen companies. Such standards tolerate certain 
percentages of impermissible activities.  Such 
guidelines are considered transitory; to be modified as 
more Shari'a-compliant companies are established.  
2. Sukuk 
Sukuk are undivided common shares titles to real 
assets, usufruct, goods and services.   They can be 
issued for the purpose of securitizing a bunch of 
assets, for example leased real estate, machinery or 
equipment.  Sukuk holders are considered as owners 
of common shares in the securitized bunch.  The 
securitized basket can also include receivables from 
Shari'a compliant activities, debt created through 
commodity finance and cash.  However, a certain limit 
on the percentage of such monetary assets included in 
securitization must be observed. 
Sukuk can also be issued to finance projects.  Sukuk 
holders would own undivided common shares in the 
net assets of the project securitized.  Sukuk can be 
issued for a particular project or a bunch of projects, 
e.g., to finance the government investment budget, a 
collection of infrastructure projects, or a group of 
development projects.  They can also be issued to 
finance trade or any type of short- or long-term 
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investment. 
3. Other Islamic financial instruments 
Shari'a-compliant funds can be   established   and 
fund certificates can be issued against them.  Shares 
in syndicated finance can also be sold in the form of 
certificates.  Generally, any Shari'a-compliant 
investment can be securitized into certificates and 
traded, provided it does not involve interest or the sale 
of present against future money. 
E. RULES OF TRADING IN FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Sale and purchase of financial instruments is subject 
to the same Shari'a rules applied to the   sale contract.   
1. Each a sale contract must have a number of pillars, 
the buyer, the seller, free will of both, the price and 
the sold item. Most importantly, the sold item must 
be legitimate property, i.e., property considered 
lawful by Shari'a.  This means that the sale of 
liquor, tobacco, etc.  would be void11. 
2. In a sale contract you can postpone one of the two 
counter values (payment of price and delivery of 
goods), but not both.  In other words you can take 
delivery of goods and pay later, as in deferred-
payment sale.  Alternatively, you can pay the price 
and get delivery at a later date, as in Salam.  But to 
postpone both, as in futures contracts is strictly 
prohibited. 
3. Trading of risk is strictly prohibited.  Sale contracts 
involving risk trading are called by Shari'a Gharar 
                                                   
11 Liquor is considered legitimate to own and trade by non-Muslims, unless their religion (according to 
their interpretation) prohibits that.  For example, breaking a bottle of liquor possessed by a Muslim requires 
no compensation.  However, if a Muslim breaks a bottle of liquor possessed by a Christian, compensation 
is enforceable.    
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contracts.  They are considered void.  Examples in 
financial markets are derivatives, including puts, 
calls, swaps, etc. 
ADVANTAGES OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
This section examines Islamic finance from several 
sides, including efficiency, stability, moral hazard and 
adverse selection, role in economic development, 
integrity, equity and sustainability.   
I. EFFICIENCY 
At the macroeconomic level, Islamic finance avoids the 
use of interest-based lending.  The rate of interest is 
replaced by the rate of profit on equity and profit-
sharing finance, by markups on credit-purchase 
finance and by rental rates on leasing finance.  While 
the time-value of money is maintained, there is no 
need to handle the complicated questions of how to 
bring the rate of interest down to zero in order to reach 
the optimal allocation of resources.   
Conventional finance allocates financial resources with 
paramount regard for borrower’s ability to repay loan 
principal and interest.  In modes of Islamic finance 
that are based on equity and profit sharing, focus 
would be on the profitability and rate of return of the 
concerned investment.  This type of finance has the 
potential of directing financial resources to the most 
productive investments.  This would increase the 
efficiency of the financing process and reinforce 
efficiency in the real sectors. 
Modes of Islamic finance that are based on mark-up 
finance the acquisition of goods and services, 
including productive assets.  When conducted in an 
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open market with sufficient competition, the cost of 
finance, or mark-up, will depend on the relative value 
in use of each commodity, whether in consumption or 
production.  Resource allocation would again be 
optimal.       
II. STABILITY 
A conventional bank has on the one hand liabilities 
that include demand, time and saving deposits, which 
the bank guarantees.  On the other hand, it has assets 
that are mostly composed of debt instruments each of 
which has quality that depends on the ability of the 
corresponding debtor to repay.  Default on the asset 
side, if it happens in significant proportion, would 
imply inability to meet the bank’s obligations on the 
liability side.  Such default can be expected at times of 
crises, be it of macroeconomic nature or caused by 
circumstances specific to the bank. 
A bank operating according to Islamic rules of finance 
has liabilities of different nature.  Only demand 
deposits are guaranteed.  Meanwhile, investment 
deposits are placed on profit-and-loss-sharing basis.  
When such bank faces macroeconomic or bank-
specific crises, investment depositors automatically 
share the risk.  The bank is less likely to fall and a 
bank run is less probable.  It can therefore be said 
that an Islamic banking system is relatively more 
stable when compared to conventional banking (Khan, 
1986). 
In conventional finance, present money is traded in an 
integrated debt market against future money, which 
takes the shape of commitments to pay specified 
amounts at specified future dates, or bonds.  Bonds 
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are supposed to be easily traded financial instruments, 
many of which are listed in international financial 
markets.  Hundreds of billions of dollars of debt are 
traded daily in those markets.  Bonds markets provide 
an easy and automatic mechanism through which 
short-term funds flow at will from one country to 
another.  Much of those flows follow factors that are 
only nebulously related to economic fundamentals.  
They bring an important element of instability into 
national economies.  They threaten the world economy 
with the spread of instability that might start in one 
single debt market in a fashion that economists have 
come to call “contagion.” 
The integrated debt market has grown immense in size 
as well as in scale of integration that now 
encompasses the whole world economy.  Many 
experiences, as lately manifested in the Southeast 
Asian economies, have shown that integrated debt 
markets are sources of both domestic financial 
instability and contagion.  Some economists have 
come forward with proposals to place restrictions on 
capital movements in contrary with what has been 
considered in economics as received doctrine.   
In contrast, debt is created in Islamic finance through 
selling goods and services on credit.  Resulting debt 
instruments are not readily tradable.  We can visualize 
the existence of a credit market for each commodity 
and service in which the demand and supply to buy it 
on credit determines a mark-up rate.  Such credit 
markets would be fully segmented, while the debt 
instruments themselves are traded only for nominal 
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values at maturity12.  There is no room for sudden and 
mass movements of funds.  Possibilities of instability 
and contagion through the debt market would 
therefore be remote and the justifications to choke 
capital movements with restrictions become 
unnecessary. 
Examination of daily records of trading in financial 
markets vividly shows that institutional participants 
carry out huge speculative transactions.  More often 
than not, such transactions are sources of 
instabilities.  In contrast, Islamic financial institutions 
are automatically prevented from carrying out such 
gambling activities; destabilizing speculations would 
be significantly curtailed in financial markets.   
We have noted above that Islamic finance never 
provides present money in return for future money.  
All Islamic modes of finance involve money on the one 
end and goods and services on the other.  Monetary 
flows through Islamic financial modes would have to 
be tied directly with commodity flows.  In other words, 
Islamic finance removes the dichotomy between 
financial and real activities.  Obviously, this leaves 
little room for excessive credit expansion, as the 
finance extended is automatically earmarked for 
specific uses. 
Speculative activities related to interest rate 
expectations would become out of place.  Changes in 
spending would automatically be reflected on changes 
in demands and supplies of goods and services, 
causing quantities of output produced to respond 
                                                   
12 At maturity both countervalues, viz., debt and its nominal value would be spot and equal in amount, 
thereby fullfilling the necessary conditions for trading money in Islam.  Meanwhile, debt can be swapped 
against tangible goods or services (according to Imam Malik and Ibn Taymiah, but not for cash. 
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more quickly to market forces.  In other words, 
markets are more likely to operate efficiently and 
smoothly.  It is therefore interesting to note that 
Islamic finance, though non-conventional, supports 
market forces and mechanisms more than does 
conventional finance.   
III. MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION 
As mentioned above, Islamic banks can be likened to 
universal banks, especially as they carry out both 
investment and commercial banking activities.  
However, not all conclusions related to universal 
banks would automatically hold to Islamic banks.  
Differences may arise due mostly to external factors, 
like the existence of organized and active equity 
markets that would compete with investment banking 
in providing external finance.  The whole regulatory 
and supervisory environment can be critical in 
influencing the ultimate characteristics of both 
universal and Islamic banking.  In addition, 
conventions and cultural elements may also interfere 
as external factors. 
We must note as examples of the external factors that 
universal banking performance and practices in Japan 
would differ in many respects from those in Germany, 
for several external factors that would include culture 
and conventions.  While universal banking is not 
prohibited by regulations in Britain, practices of 
investment banking should differ from those in 
Germany as the stock market is much more developed 
in the former than in the latter. 
The main characteristic that concerns us in relation to 
moral hazard and adverse selection is that Islamic 
banks, like universal banks can hold equity in the 
 25 
banks they finance.  In this respect, they bear 
resemblance to universal banks and can be thought to 
handle the problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection better than conventional banks because.   
However, some reservations have lately been levied 
against universal banking.  This section deals with two 
main questions.  First, how both universal and Islamic 
banks can better handle moral hazard and adverse 
selection.  Second, some of the controversies around 
universal banking are briefly exposed to show the 
reader that most of them have not made much dent, at 
least as yet, in the greater ability of universal banking 
to handle moral hazard and adverse selection.  
A. 16BOPERATING AS UNIVERSAL BANKS 
We have mentioned above that Islamic banks hold 
equity and trade in goods and services as they operate 
as universal rather than commercial banks.  Universal 
banks are defined as “large-scale banks that operate 
extensive networks of branches, provide many different 
services, hold several claims on firms (including equity 
and debt), and participate directly in the corporate 
governance of the firms that rely on the banks as 
sources of funding or as securities underwriters, 
“(Calomiris, 2000).   
A bank can be exposed to moral hazard when the firm 
obtaining finance uses the funds for purposes other 
than those for which finance was advanced.  This 
could lead to business failure and inability to repay on 
part of the debtor firm.  The bank would be exposed to 
adverse selection when it fails to choose the finance 
applicants who are most likely to perform. 
Obviously, adverse selection can be avoided by careful 
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screening of finance applicants.  When a bank 
provides equity and debt finance simultaneously, it 
will have more access to information than when only 
debt finance is provided.  We can therefore conclude 
that screening would be more effective and adverse 
selection less probable with universal banking. 
Reducing the possibilities of moral hazard requires 
monitoring the firm that obtains finance.  All three 
kinds of ex ante, interim and ex post monitoring must 
be exercised to be effective (Aoki, Masahiko, 1994).  
Equity finance provides the bank with access to 
information necessary to practice monitoring at all 
intervals.  That explains why the research of Dewenter 
and Hess (1997) supports the idea that relationship 
(universal) banks are more effective monitors than 
transactional (commercial) banks.  
Equity finance also reduces the firm incentives to 
substitute riskier for safer assets.  Meanwhile, debt 
finance would reduce the firm incentives to hide its 
profits.  Furthermore, when the firm faces problems, 
the bank, as an equity holder, will assist in order to 
protect its investment.  
In summary, banking theory indicates that universal 
banking would be exposed to lower levels of moral 
hazard and adverse selection.  In addition, by sitting 
on the firms’ board of directors, banks could influence 
corporate governance in the whole productive sector, 
leading to improvements in economic performance.  
Empirically, it has been found that using a 
combination of debt and equity finance by banks 
seems to carry several advantages to both banks and 
firms, confirming theoretical findings.  Banking theory 
would indicate that banks would be relatively more 
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exposed to adverse selection during economic upturns 
and to moral hazard during downturns.  Applied 
research has found that universal banks face lower 
risk than commercial banks during both upturns and 
downturns.  In addition, the risk differential between 
universal and commercial banks gets wider and more 
significant during downturns (Dewenter and Hess, 
1998).  
A. DOUBTS ABOUT UNIVERSAL BANKING 
The following doubts, in relation to universal banks 
ability to deal with moral hazard and adverse 
selection, have been levied against universal banking:  
♦ Alteration of Corporate Capital Structure In 
Favor Of Debt and Against Equity  
Universal banks are seen as institutions that facilitate 
access to information about firms. German universal 
banks are described as financial supermarkets 
providing commercial banking, securities 
underwriting, and brokerage, holding positions on the 
supervisory boards of joint-stock companies, voting 
equity shares in proxy for customers, and sometimes 
taking short-term stakes in companies (Fohlin, 
2000b). Theoretically, the presence of universal 
banking and the resulting bank attachments with 
corporations, could therefore give some firms more 
access to external finance thereby motivating them to 
change their preferences regarding debt finance. 
Fohlin (2000b) found that, universal banking is not 
associated with different leverage nor debt maturity 
structure. While older firms continue to have lower 
leverage and short-term debt, bank attachment is not 
associated with earlier than average reductions in 
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leverage as firms mature or with alterations in the 
predictors of short-term debt use. The findings offer 
little support for the idea that formal bank-firm 
relationships altered the financing options or choices 
of German industrial firms.   
♦ 141BUniversal Banking Inefficiently Combines 
Banking with Trade 
Barth, Caprio and Levine’s (2000) empirical study 
highlights the negative implications of imposing 
regulatory restrictions on the activities of commercial 
banks. Specifically, regulations that restrict the ability 
of banks to (a) engage in securities activities and (b) 
own non-financial firms are closely associated with 
greater banking sector instability. Their analyses, 
moreover, suggest no countervailing positive benefits 
from restricting the mixing of banking and commerce 
or from restricting the activities of banks in the areas 
of investment banking, insurance, and real estate. 
♦ 142B ank Relationship and Firm Profitability 
Under universal banking, firms deal with one bank 
which is also one of its shareholders.  Some 
economists suspects that such single firm-bank 
relationship could be less profitable. 
Degryse, Hans and Steven Ongena (2000) empirical 
work suggests that the profitability of Norwegian 
publicly listed firms with bilateral bank relationships 
is higher than the profitability of firms with 
multilateral relationships. This result is quite robust. 
It holds controlling for firm age, size, debt, asset 
intangibility, and Tobin’s Q and in a variety of 
specifications. The result seems conform an 
implication of Yosha (1995) and von Rheinbaben and 
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Ruckes (1998). If firms disclose proprietary 
information to creditors, firms using bilateral financing 
achieve higher sales profitability than those using 
multilateral financing. 
♦ 143BThe Organ Bank Hypothesis 
Universal banking opens the door to banks to 
establish special relationships with the companies in 
which they hold stock and finance simultaneously.  
Such relationship could reflect negatively on the 
efficiency and stability of the banking system.  This 
“Organ Bank Hypothesis” was advanced first by the 
Japanese Economist T. Kato and tested recently by 
Okazaki and Yokoyama (2001).  They have found that 
in prewar Japan that interlocking directorship and 
auditing between banks and non-banking companies 
to be very pervasive and more so in large size banks.  
They also found that interlocking had negative 
influence on banks liquidity performance and 
profitability which played a roll in increasing bank 
closures during the Showa Financial Crises of 1927. 
In contrast, when studying the German universal 
banking system in the pre-World War I period, in 
comparison with the banking system prevailing in the 
UK and the USA, Fohlin (2000a) finds a different 
perspective. Her results indicate that universality does 
not lead to appreciable market power. They imply that 
concentration in the German banking industry does 
not in itself produce anti-competitive behavior.  
We can therefore conclude that other reasons may 
explain the Japanese case, and the Organ Bank 
Hypothesis is by no means generally valid. 
♦ 144BThe Conflict Of Interest Hypothesis 
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Gorton and Schmidt (1996) consider universal banking 
to be an alternative mechanism to stock market for 
risk sharing that could provide information to guide 
investment.  In Germany, the stock market has been 
historically small.  Universal banks hold equity as well 
as proxy voting rights over their customers’ stock 
holdings.  They lend to firms and sit on their corporate 
boards simultaneously.  If German banks were acting 
as substitutes to the stock market, their behavior 
would improve corporate performance.  Alternatively, 
banks could benefit from the inside information they 
gather about the firms they lend while exercising 
monopolistic power over access to external finance.  
This would lead to conflict of interest between banks 
and other shareholders, particularly those who have 
delegated their voting proxy rights.   
Gorton and Schmidt (1996) test the conflict-of-interest 
hypothesis between German banks during the 1970s 
and 1980s.  They find that German banks improved 
the performance of firms they finance to the extent of 
their equity holdings.  No evidence was found on the 
conflict of interest concerning the use of proxy votes.  
This was the case in their sample of 1974.  In 1985, 
German security markets became more developed.  
While banks continued to affect corporate 
performance, their influence could not be 
distinguished from that of non-bank shareholders. The 
study of Gorton and Schmidt appears to cast 
substantial doubt on the conflict-of-interest 
hypothesis. 
Gorton and Schmidt (1996) investigate the potential 
conflict of interest in the issuance of public securities 
when the underwriting of the initial offering is done by 
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an investment bank that holds equity in the concerned 
firm.  The underwriter would be similar to a universal 
bank.  The evidence in their study suggests that the 
conflict of interest does exist, in the sense that the 
underwriting bank is able to utilize the superior 
information it obtains through its affiliation with the 
firm.  Yet, the effects of the conflict of interest are fully 
discounted, as they are fully anticipated by all market 
participants.  In this regard, Gorton and Schmidt find 
that initial public offering underwritten for a firm by 
its affiliated investment bank performs as well or 
better than issues of firms in which no investment 
bank holds a prior equity position.  
♦ Bank Concentration and Concentration in the 
Industrial Sector 
In the European experience, concentration in universal banking 
was often associated with concentration in the industrial sector.  
Da Rin and Hellmann (2001) consider in their big-push model the 
issue of concentration13.  They theorize that universal banks start 
with financing pioneers in their own industries.  Then, they 
continue to finance incumbents. They conclude that large and 
powerful banks have a vested interest in preserving industrial 
monopolies.  However, universal banks need to be powerful and 
large to succeed in limiting entry into the financial market.  They 
also need either the outright support of government translated into 
regulations or at least their acquiescence.   
♦ Corporate Governance 
The fact that universal banks sit on boards of firms 
they finance and have power that may exceed what 
would be commensurate with their own equity 
holdings could create problems of corporate 
                                                   
13 For other models on the ills ofmarket power in financial markets, see Hart (1983) orAghion, Dewatripont 
and Rey (1997). 
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governance.  First, to internalize the privileges usually 
accorded to board members, universal banks 
management would tend to appoint representatives to 
boards from within the narrowest circle of top 
management.  Sooner or later, the few members of top 
management find themselves overloaded the job of 
monitoring the performance of too many banks.  That 
would make monitoring much less effective. 
Second, members of universal banks top management 
may not have the necessary knowledge and skills to 
exercise monitoring effectively.  Third, as they are top 
management members, their reporting on the board 
meetings they attend may turn to be too brief and non-
technical for technicians whose job is limited to desk-
type follow-up to draw the right conclusions at the 
right time.  
All the above problems would be easily avoided by 
regulations and supervision.  Simple rules setting the 
proper qualifications of banks representatives on the 
boards, putting a ceiling on the number of board 
membership and perhaps prohibiting top management 
from taking board membership outside their banks 
would certainly ameliorate the situation. 
IV. FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
Some economists believe that the universal banking 
that combines all phases of finance can be credited in 
part for industrial development and economic growth 
in Germany and Japan.  Universal banking, is thought 
to have yielded economies of scope and greater 
efficiency that provided more finance at lower costs, 
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thereby promoting industrial investment.13 F14 In 
particular, German banks have been perceived to have 
maintained close, long-term relationships with 
industrial firms, which influenced banks attitudes 
towards multiperiod optimization (Fohlin, 1998).  This 
opinion is supported by Terrin (1998), but opposed by 
Fohlin (1998) as well as Miwa and Ramseyer (2000). 
Given the characteristics of Islamic finance mentioned 
above, particularly the fact that Islamic banks operate 
according to the rules of universal rather than 
commercial banking, we can ask which system gives 
better support to economic development.  In this 
regard, we can intuitively conclude that the practice of 
universal banking by Islamic banks put their financing 
activities right in the center of the development 
process.  Bankers in this case become both partners 
and financiers of entrepreneurial efforts to develop the 
economy.  Empirical findings seem to confirm such 
intuition. 
Calomiris (2000), through his study of pre-World-War I 
Germany, has found that universal banking served to 
reduce the cost of financing industrialization in 
Germany relative to its corresponding level in other 
countries where commercial banking is prevalent.  He 
also found that the financial sector reached a higher 
level of allocative efficiency in the former than in the 
latter country.  We can therefore rest assured that 
banks operating as universal banks give better 
support to development efforts.   
It is widely accepted that economic development 
                                                   
14 For a theoretical analysis of the relationship between finance and growth, see, e. g,, Greenwood and 
Smith (1997). 
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requires mobilization of vast financial resources both 
internally and externally.  Any financial resources left 
hoarded would imply unrealized potential for economic 
development.  As Islamic teachings emphatically 
prohibit trading present for future money at a rate of 
interest, many Muslims hold their funds outside the 
banking and financial sector, thereby missing an 
opportunity to apply those funds to the development 
process.  Islamic finance opens the door to the effective 
use of much needed financial resources within many 
Islamic countries that would be otherwise kept idle.  In 
addition, it provides Muslims with a way through 
which they can participate in the development process 
without exceeding their religious beliefs.  Muslim 
minorities in other countries, whose banking systems 
do not provide Islamic financial products, suffer from 
cultural exclusion.  Some of those Muslims may have to 
keep their savings outside the financial system thereby 
contributing to idle financial resources in their 
countries. 
V. INTEGRITY 
Conventional finance can be likened to a spectator’s 
game where few skilled players stay in the playground 
and a big crowd is watching from outside.  Islamic 
finance, meanwhile, is similar to participatory sports, 
where everyone is playing and no one is concerned 
with mere watching.  In addition, there is a moral side 
to Islamic finance that seems to be in the back of mind 
of everyone. 
Risk is known to be one of the most important 
ingredients of making investment.  Those who finance 
investment share a good part of the risk involved with 
those who carry out actual investment activities.  
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Conventional finance leaves risk to be borne by 
specialists.  Banks and financial institutions provide 
investors with loans guaranteed by collateral.  In this 
fashion, they keep themselves apart from certain kinds 
of risk, like those attached to production, marketing 
and distribution, and limit their exposure to risk 
related to collateral only. 
Islamic finance allows savers who deposit their funds 
to share with banks the risks associated with choosing 
the right investment and how successful it would be.  
Banks and financial institutions advancing funds 
share risk with those receiving finance, including 
producers, traders, and the like.  Islamic finance with 
proper corporate governance allows depositors some 
influence on banks investment decisions and allows 
banks and financial institutions a share in the 
decision-making process, by sitting on the boards of 
directors of firms receiving funds.   
We can therefore notice that risk as well as decision-
making is spread over a much larger number and 
wider variety of concerned people.  Risk sharing is 
balanced by sharing in decision-making.  This allows 
for wider involvement in economic activities, so that 
people will eventually feel they are partners rather 
than spectators.  
The benefit of wider involvement goes beyond the mere 
feeling of involvement.  It adds to the stability of 
banks.  Holders of investment deposits with banks 
share in both the profits and losses.  When a bank 
faced the unlikely event of an overall loss over the 
placement of its investment pool, its depositors 
shoulder their proportional share of the loss.  
Individual banks as well as the banking system as a 
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whole would therefore be less likely to break down. 
VI. EQUITY 
Islamic financial institutions must be viewed as 
basically private profit-seeking business enterprises 
that operate according to the market mechanism.  By 
themselves, they cannot reduce, let alone, eradicate 
poverty.  However, if given the right tools, they can 
contribute to the efforts taken by the whole society in 
that regard.   
Islam prescribes a tax-subsidy approach to reducing 
poverty.  A levy called Zakah is paid out by the wealthy 
(those whose wealth exceeds a certain minimum level) 
in proportion to their property. 
Zakah proceeds are to be earmarked for several uses 
including income and wealth maintenance for the 
poor.  Income maintenance is provided within narrow 
limits to those incapable of work and wealth 
maintenance is provided to the rest of the poor.  The 
latter policy entails giving the poor productive assets, 
which they can use to produce goods and services and 
sell them for profit.  This method of poverty reduction 
can be closely intertwined with that of economic 
development, as redistribution is mostly directed 
towards making the poor more productive, which in 
turn contributes to economic development.   
Income maintenance would involve regular (monthly) 
payments to the needy.  Wealth maintenance, 
meanwhile, involves transferring to the poor a 
combination of productive resources, which would be 
capable of generating sufficient income to maintain at 
least one household. 
Zakah collection would be expected to be carried out 
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mostly by nongovernmental and sometimes by 
governmental organizations.  Islamic banks can help 
by acting as custodians and in the disbursement of the 
proceeds.  In addition, non-banking financial 
institutions can also take part in collecting Zakah, 
using Islamic banks as depositories, and invest the 
proceeds allocated to the poor in special accounts with 
Islamic financial institutions, to which they would also 
add a proportion of Zakah due on their shareholders 
equity15.  They can even accept direct payments of 
Zakah and other donations on behalf of philanthropic 
institutions.   
As to income maintenance, Islamic banks and 
financial institutions can credit the accounts of the 
prescribed poor with monthly payments.  Wealth 
maintenance can be implemented through the 
establishment of micro enterprises that would be 
owned and operated by the poor.  While, the titles to 
such enterprises are transferred to the poor, certain 
measures must be taken to insure that the new 
businesses would not be immaturely liquidated to 
finance consumption outlays for their owners.  The 
experience of Islamic banking and financial 
institutions in project financing should come in handy 
in eradicating poverty and increasing equity through 
proper use of Zakah proceeds. 
Conventional lending gives utmost attention to the 
ability to repay loans.  To ascertain such ability, it 
depends overwhelmingly on the provisions of 
collaterals and guarantees.  Thus those already rich 
                                                   
15 Understandably, there may be other expenditures items which would be financed from zakah proceeds.  
That is why only a proportion of them would be handed to collectors.  Such proportion can be determined 
by society and could change from year to year. 
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would have most access to finance.  In contrast, 
Islamic finance providing funds on equity or profit-
sharing basis would be more concerned about 
profitability and rate of return and less concerned 
about collateral as the primary consideration.  Those 
who are not wealthy, but have worthy investment 
projects, would have more access to finance.     
VII. SUSTAINABILITY 
Conventional debt has certain characteristics that 
could place debtors in difficulties if circumstances do 
not allow them to repay in time.  Interest is usually 
calculated on the outstanding balance of debt, usually 
compounded annually and sometimes at shorter 
intervals.  Delinquent debtors are often subjected to 
penalty rates of interest, which are higher than regular 
rates.  It is not uncommon to find borrowers who end 
up paying debt service that is many folds the original 
principal they borrowed.  This is particularly 
symptomatic of developing countries debt, as they 
continue to face debt problems that sometimes reach 
crisis levels.  Creditor countries and institutions have 
often sought to find ways and mechanisms to provide 
debt relief to debtor countries.  Despite continuous 
efforts, the debt problems faced by developing 
countries seem to be ever-present.   
We can therefore conclude that interest based 
financing lacks a great deal of sustainability.  
Creditors have to stop every few years to give debtors 
relief in terms of rescheduling and forgiveness.  
Sometimes this also includes floating low quality debt 
at lower market value and swapping it with equity.  
The system has demonstrated unsustainability several 
times. 
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Unconventional debt created through Islamic finance 
has characteristics with which debt crises are less 
likely to rise.  Particularly, the total value of debt, 
which includes the spot value of commodities 
purchased on credit as well as an implicit mark-up, is 
set from the very beginning.  The total value of debt 
can be repaid in installments, without increase in its 
total value, as there is no compounded interest to pay 
on outstanding balance. 
When debtors face unavoidable circumstances that 
would make them temporarily insolvent, they are often 
granted grace periods to help them bring their finances 
back to order.  No penalty fees can be levied in this 
case.  In other words, debt rescheduling, when 
justifiable, would be granted at no extra cost to 
borrowers.  Therefore, we can conclude that Islamic 
finance is sustainable and less liable in itself to cause 
undue hardship to debtors. 
Quite often, conventional debt cannot be repaid 
because it was not used for its prescribed purpose.  
Under the rules of conventional finance, creditors 
assume that the use of the loans they extend would 
strengthen the ability of debtors to meet their future 
obligations.  However, conventional loans are usually 
offered without ways or mechanisms to assure their 
use for certain purposes16.  In contrast, Islamic debt is 
created through the finance of acquiring goods and 
services on credit.  In other words, the loan is used 
from the very beginning for its prescribed purpose.  
Default resulting from improper use of borrowed funds 
would therefore be most unlikely. 
                                                   
16 In cases where a loan is earmarked for the purchase of commodities, a conventional bank would find it 
cheaper to inforce earmarking through a sale-finance contract. 
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As Islamic finance provided to finance investment is 
asset-based, i.e., it is used to acquire real assets; it is 
much less likely to lead to debt crises.  Such type of 
asset-based finance, directly contributes to the ability 
of the economy to meet its internal and external 
financial obligations.  This is certainly a welcome 
effect. 
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accEPTaNcE OF IslamIc FINaNcE 
Islamic finance has achieved a great deal of progress 
especially in the areas of financial innovation, central 
banking operations, establishing money markets, 
accounting, disclosure, regulation, and rating 
standards.  The relationships between Islamic and 
conventional banking and financial institutions have 
been cooperative and mutually beneficial.  Nonetheless 
Islamic finance has not expanded to its full potential.  
We will take these issues in this section. 
Islamic finance has been practiced for more than a 
quarter of a century.  It has gained acceptance and 
succeeded in making inroads into the financial 
industry, providing services to Muslims and non-
Muslims alike.  The size of the Islamic finance industry 
is estimated to go beyond $150 billion, and is still 
growing strong.  A large number of Islamic banks and 
financial institutions have been established in both 
Muslim and non-Muslim countries.  Some Muslim 
countries, notably Iran, Pakistan and Sudan have 
established full-fledged Islamic monetary and financial 
systems.  Others, e.g., Bahrain and Malaysia have 
sought to develop a significant Islamic financial sector 
with modern capabilities.  Many conventional banks, 
both national and international have entered the field 
of Islamic finance through opening windows and 
branches.    
The record of Islamic banking and financial 
institutions indicates that Islamic finance started as 
an innovative non-conventional way of doing business 
and quickly gained success, popularity, and 
acceptance.  That may indicate that it is useful both to 
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individuals and societies.  We elaborate below some of 
its accomplishments.    
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF ISLAMIC FINANCE  
Some of the most recent accomplishments of Islamic 
finance are noted below. 
I. DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 
Islamic finance is not only practiced at the domestic 
level in the form of retail and wholesale banking, but 
also extends to the area of development finance at the 
international level. 
The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) is an 
international financial institution with a membership 
of 54 countries.  Its subscribed capital has recently 
been raised to SDR 8.1 billion.  It represents one of the 
most significant manifestations of south-south 
cooperation.  While its members are all developing 
countries, each member benefits from the IsDB 
resources in proportion of its developmental need 
rather than its capital subscription.  The IsDB works 
in close cooperation with the World Bank, the IMF and 
regional financial institutions.   
During its first 25 years of operations that ended in 
March 2001, the IsDB provided project financing and 
technical assistance exceeding SDR 5.5 billion and 
trade financing of around SDR 12.2 billion.  Out of 
project financing, 28.2 percent went to public utilities, 
21 percent to public sector, 16.7 percent to transport 
and communication, 13.8 percent to agriculture, 13 
percent to industry and mining and 6.7 percent to 
financial services and other sectors.  In total, SDR 3.1 
billion went to project financing in IsDB least 
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developed member countries, which amounts to 56.4 
percent of total project finance (Islamic Development 
Bank, 1421H).    
Asset Securitization: 
Much of the efforts in Bahrain, Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Iran, and 
Sudan have been concluded with the successful issue 
of new and innovative Islamic financial instruments for 
financing both private and public sectors operations.  
More fruits are expected to come forth as those efforts 
continue.  Simultaneously, efforts are intensifying to 
resolve some serious and possibly troublesome 
jurisprudential issues. 
One of the examples of success has been in the area of 
identifying a collection of government-owned income-
earning assets of high quality and issuing financial 
instruments backed by them.  Such instruments are 
readily tradable in the market and can be used to 
carry out open market operations.  Similar examples of 
leasing- and Salam- based instruments are found.  
Such instruments would reduce the government need 
for deficit finance and help in developing an Islamic 
financial market. 
In addition, the Islamic development bank itself has 
developed the Islamic Banks Portfolio and the Unit 
Investment Fund.  Both represent asset-backed 
securities held by Islamic financial institutions and 
backed by assets, which they manage.  The IsDB has 
also established the Infrastructure Fund and the 
Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private 
Sector, ICD.  Both institutions are qualified to issue 
asset-backed securities to finance their operations.   
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II. CENTRAL BANKING OPERATIONS: 
Sudan has succeeded in developing fully-fledged 
central banking operations that are in line with Islamic 
principles to serve its banking system and to regain 
control of monetary and credit aggregates.  Pakistan is 
evolving similar central banking operations that would 
suit transforming its banking and financial system to 
an Islamic system.  Malaysia has developed its central 
banking operations to deal with a mixed system that 
combines both conventional and Islamic finance. 
Such operations include designing regulatory and 
supervisory rules specially tailored for Islamic 
banking, centralized Shari’ah committee in the central 
bank to insure compliance, product quality as well as 
homogeneity of products.  They also involve setting up 
rules for an inter-bank market that avoids the use of 
the rate of interest.  
III. INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC FINANCIAL 
MARKET: 
The Islamic Development Bank has joined efforts with 
some of its member countries as well as international 
financial institutions to provide the necessary 
infrastructure for establishing an International Islamic 
Financial Market (IIFM).  Such efforts included the 
following: 
• ESTABLISHING THE Islamic Financial Services Board 
that would develop and assist in applying 
internationally recognized regulatory and 
supervisory standards for Islamic finance.  The 
Board includes in its membership several 
monetary authorities in countries having Islamic 
banks and financial institutions in addition to the 
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IMF and the Basle Committee for banking 
supervision.  The Board will soon launch its 
operations from its headquarters in Malaysia. 
• The IDB and some of its membership have 
launched the Council of the International Islamic 
Financial Market that would operate as a guiding 
authority in cooperation with concerned central 
banks to regulate and supervise Islamic financial 
activities.  In particular, it would set up guidelines 
for the design and trading of Islamic financial 
instruments.  It has recently been founded in 
Bahrain. 
• The Bahrain Monetary Agency is currently 
working hard to establish the first Liquidity 
Management Center, which will provide the 
services to public and private institutions that 
wish to issue asset-backed securities.  It is 
expected that the pioneering efforts in Bahrain 
would be followed by establishing similar liquidity 
management centers in other countries, 
eventually leading to the proliferation of Islamic 
financial instruments.  
• The Islamic Development Bank has been working 
on establishing an Islamic Rating Agency, which is 
expected to come to life soon.     
IV. ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING STANDARDS: 
Through the efforts of the Islamic Development Bank 
and the active collaboration of many Islamic banks 
and monetary authorities, the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic financial Institutions (AAOIFI) 
was established in Bahrain.  It has issued a set of 
accounting standards, which have become quickly 
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acceptable by many regulatory authorities.  AAOIFI 
also prepared standards on Capital Adequacy, 
Governance and Shari’ah Standards, which are readily 
applicable to Islamic financial institutions. 
 
RELATIONS BETWEEN ISLAMIC AND 
CONVENTIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
The relationships between Islamic and conventional 
banking and financial institutions have proven fruitful 
in many aspects.  The market mechanism has enabled 
both kinds of institutions to interact and develop 
working relationships and alliances. 
A. LESSONS ISLAMIC AND CONVENTIONAL 
BANKS CAN LEARN FROM EACH OTHER. 
Islamic financial institutions share with their 
conventional counterparts similar specializations and 
business interests.  Differences that exist between 
their modes of operations afford them excellent 
opportunities to cooperate and collaborate.  Areas like 
joint financing and financial market operations can be 
the stage of daily collaboration.  As conventional 
financial institutions have been first in the field, they 
can be a valuable source for professional techniques 
and standards.  In other words, Islamic financial 
institutions have a lot to learn from conventional 
financial institutions in this regard. 
Islamic financial institutions, being aware of their 
innovative methods, have toiled to develop the new 
modes of finance.  That included a lot of work to 
formulate new contractual arrangements on both their 
asset and liability sides.  In addition, they have been 
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able to acquire a niche that conventional financial 
institutions do not have.  The latter can participate 
and make use of such new and innovative techniques 
that would help them better serve their customers. 
As would be expected, Islamic financial institutions 
depend on their conventional counterparts in working 
with financial markets.  They often collaborate to 
design new products, which they can jointly market 
and manage.  This includes funds, securities, and the 
like. 
Many of the funds created and marketed by Islamic 
financial institutions involve financial instruments 
traded in international financial centers as well as 
financial centers in emerging markets.  Trading in 
those instruments would have to be done through 
conventional financial institutions, which are 
geographically proximate to those markets.  The 
management of such funds may also require the 
assistance of financial services institutions, which are 
closely located and may even have trading privileges in 
those markets.     
V. CAN CONVENTIONAL BANKS LEGITIMATELY 
OFFER ISLAMIC FACILITIES? 
One of the ultimate indicators of the success of Islamic 
finance is that their modes of operations appear 
sufficiently attractive to conventional financial 
institutions so that they ultimately enter the market of 
Islamic finance as partners or even as competitors to 
Islamic financial institutions.  This is an important 
area where collaboration can introduce a wider variety 
of financial products into the market.  Competition 
would also improve efficiency and benefit both savers 
and investors. 
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Through cooperation with Islamic financial 
institutions, conventional institutions can ascertain 
the quality of their Islamic financial products.  If they 
wish to compete, they must make sure that their 
products have the proper qualities that the market of 
Islamic finance requires.  Otherwise, the market could 
end up being cluttered with products that meet little 
interest on the customers’ side.  In particular, 
compliance of Islamic rules of finance must not be 
compromised, if financial products are to be marketed 
as Islamic. 
Given that conventional producers of Islamic financial 
services are strictly observing the quality requirements 
of such products, we can safely say that Islamic 
finance will increasingly gain universal acceptance.  
This will demonstrate that Islamic finance is not just 
for Muslims alone.  It is rather for everybody.   
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ISLAMIC FINANCE 
Now we come to the final question we raised with 
regard to Islamic finance.  Theoretically and 
empirically, it is not difficult for specialists in 
economics and finance to find Islamic finance not only 
viable and acceptable, but also efficient and 
significantly effective.  It is not therefore surprising to 
see large multinational financial institutions providing 
Islamic financial services to their customers in 
significant amounts.  As an innovation, Islamic finance 
has been practiced for more than a quarter of a 
century.  Some people might think that it should have 
received wider acceptance worldwide.  There are 
several reasons why this has not happened. 
First, Islamic finance seems quite different from 
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conventional practices, as it is not based on borrowing 
and lending.   
Second, Islamic financial institutions, like their 
conventional counterparts, can operate more 
effectively when the proper legal and institutional 
environment is provided, something that is yet to 
happen at a large scale in a significant number of 
countries.  The well-known fiscal prejudice against 
profit and in favor of interest is just an example, where 
interest payments are partially or fully tax exempt, and 
profit gets no such advantage. 
Third, the present capital markets are not adequately 
equipped to process the information required by 
Islamic finance.  This requires a careful blend of laws 
and ethics, the latter playing more important role than 
the former.  Islamic finance would thus require a 
certain set of ethics in the market.  Scholars elaborate 
on the details of the required ethics based on Islamic 
principles.  It may take some time before Islamic ethics 
are introduced appropriately in the capital market.  
Needless to say, the required ethics make sense 
irrespective of religious beliefs.  Religion, however, 
provides commitment to abide by those ethics in letter 
and spirit. 
Fourth, Islamic banks and financial institutions 
working in mixed systems that allow for both 
conventional and Islamic practices have been able to 
approach but have not yet reached their ideal model.  
Islamic financial institutions are expected to provide 
equity/profit sharing and debt finance while giving 
higher weight to the former.  Yet, when they operate in 
mixed environment, their asset structure tilts towards 
debt finance.  The reason for this is two-fold.  On the 
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one hand, dealing with equity and profit-sharing 
finance requires supporting environment and 
institutions.  On the environment side, entities 
obtaining this type of finance need to have orderly 
bookkeeping, audited financial statements, and 
suitable corporate governance.  In most countries 
where Islamic banking is practiced, those elements are 
hard to come by.  It would also make things a lot 
easier if banking laws, rules enforcing obligation 
fulfillment and credit (or investment) rating is 
available.     
They are also expected to provide debt and equity 
finance simultaneously to the same customers, as 
universal banks should do.  However, such pattern of 
operations is not common.  This could be related to 
the commercial banking culture that dominates the 
banking systems where Islamic financial institutions 
operate.  The universal banking model has to be 
brought closer to the minds of practitioners of Islamic 
finance.  Monetary and financial authorities also need 
to become more tolerant of universal banking 
especially that the movement towards banking 
deregulation has become more prevalent. 
Fifth, Islamic financial products have to increase in 
numbers and variety to form a critical mass that 
would attract a large number of transactors.  Once the 
Islamic market for financial instruments acquires 
depth and breadth, the public will find it more 
convenient to join in.    
Sixth, there is sometimes the feeling that Islamic 
finance works outside the authority of governments.  
Quite the contrary, Islamic financial institutions are 
consistently subjected to rigorous regulations and 
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supervision by authorities wherever it is practiced.  
More often than not, their regulation and supervision 
are made even more rigorous than that imposed on 
their conventional counterparts.  Those working in the 
field of Islamic finance are equally concerned about the 
integrity and the stability of both national and 
international markets. 
With no exception, all institutions practicing Islamic 
finance work under government regulatory and 
supervisory authorities in their respective countries.  
Such authorities are sufficiently empowered to collect 
information and point to violations.  All parties 
concerned with the health of world finance are invited 
to cooperate with regulatory and supervisory 
authorities to make sure that the practices of 
conventional as well as Islamic institutions cause no 
concern. 
Seventh, in order to switch to a new financial system, 
cooperation is needed from several parties, including 
bankers, savers, investors, businessmen, and 
governmental institutions.  As economists know too 
well, when cooperation is scarce, people make 
irrational decisions that keep them away from an 
optimal solution.  As economists have argued within a 
theory of reciprocity (Falk and Fischbacher 2000) in 
general and the prisoner’s dilemma (Janssen 2000) in 
particular, a subgroup of cooperating agents can, 
under certain conditions bring the whole population to 
an optimal solution.  This implies that new and 
unconventional ways, notwithstanding their 
advantages, would require a sufficient number of 
pioneers to lead the way and set an example. 
Finally, we are inclined to propose that countries 
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should give equal chance to Islamic finance to work 
side by side with conventional finance.  The market 
itself would finally decide the proper mix of both 
conventional and Islamic finance that suits the world 
economy.  By removing restrictions, obstacles and 
hindrances facing the application of Islamic finance, 
the world would benefit and economic development 
can be better served. 
In order to help the Islamic financial industry further 
develop itself and overcome the obstacles it faces, 
countries must be invited to develop and continue to 
improve the important infrastructure needed to 
support the industry and insure its proper 
functioning.  Now the institutional foundations of the 
regulation and supervision of Islamic finance has been 
established, efforts must continue to develop further 
the proper regulatory and supervisory mechanisms 
that suit Islamic finance and, at the same time, ensure 
adequate transparency, proper risk management, 
internal controls, and effective corporate governance.   
Like the conventional financial industry, the Islamic 
financial industry has its success but faces certain 
challenges.  Developing and improving the proper 
enabling environment will go a long way in helping the 
Islamic finance industry to deal with the challenges it 
faces.  Once such environment becomes sufficiently 
workable, the Islamic financial industry can become 
more capable of handling sophisticated financing 
techniques and instruments.  It can then accomplish 
more successes, especially in the areas of designing 
market-based instruments for monetary control and 
government financing that satisfy the Islamic 
principles and promote   greater reliance on equity 
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finance.   
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